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REcENT CASES
Satisfaction of a judgment by a third party simply would not in fact
disturb the peace and harmony of the home. The second and third
reasons are contradictory and an admission of either as a general prin-
ciple would be to deny the other. The danger of collusion is a com-
mon argument used by courts when reasonable arguments are not
available. Cooperation by the insured with the insurer in defense of
a claim assumes what in fact would not be true in that the insured
would not, as a practical matter, begrudge a member of his family
compensation for his injuries. Cooperation need not go that far. In
answer to the fourth argument it is not apparent why liability should
not turn on the presence of insurance if it be decided that the general
rule is the best one in cases where the defendant is not insured. Public
policy is dependent on existing circumstances as well as other reasons
that support rules of law.
Cooley, about sixty six years ago, had this to say about the im-
munity of parents to tort actions by their children: "In principle there
seems to be no reason why such an action should not be sustained
....,"32 Prosser, speaking of torts in the family, states: "Few topics in
the law of torts, in view of modem economic, social, and legislative
changes, display in their treatment greater inconsistency and more un-
satisfactory reasoning."33
In the absence of legal principle are the reasons in support of the
general rule sufficient? The abundance of reasoning which denies the
rule is as great as that which upholds it. The pervasiveness of the
general rule has been sharply diminished by cases which seize on
some factor to escape its harshness. 34 The next logical step would be
to permit an injured child or ,parent to recover for injuries sustained
from the negligent operation of an automobile where the defendant
is insured. It is to be regretted that Kentucky did not lead the way
when the opportunity presented itself to allow suits between parent
and child as it did in a suit between husband and wife. The absence
of a statute to be construed is a slender basis for the distinction.
CARL W. TUmNE
LABoR LAw-ExcLusnE PowER or Ti NLRB AGAnsT PowER OF STATE
COURT To ENjoiN Acnvrry VioLATiNG STATE LAw-The defendant
union called a strike against the American Suppliers, Inc. and placed
picket lines around its establishments. One of the establishments was
a "stemmery" situated on ground owned by the American Tobacco
Coor.=y, LAw o" TORTS 197 (2d ed. 1888).
,' Supra note 1, at 897.
Supra notes 24, 25, and 26.
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Company and completely surrounded by its cigarette factory and
auxiliary structures. The American Suppliers company, a subsidiary
of the American Tobacco Company, bought and processed all the
tobacco used by the cigarette factory. The employees of a common
carrier, who were members of the same union conducting the strike
against the American Suppliers company, refused to cross the picket
line to handle freight from the American Tobacco Company. This
was in accordance with their collective bargaining agreement giving
them the right to refuse to cross a picket line or handle "unfair"
goods. The American Tobacco Company sought to enjoin the picket-
ing, alleging that it was being subjected to a secondary boycott. It
also sought to compel the employees of the common carrier to cross
the picket line and handle its freight. The Chancellor held that the
picketing was legal, but that the employees of the common carrier
could not legally refuse to cross the picket line. Held: Affirmed. Gen-
eral Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v.
American Tobacco Company, 264 S.W. 2d 250 (Ky. 1954), cert.
granted, 348 U.S. 813 (1954).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, without considering the allega-
tion of a secondary boycott as an unfair labor practice under the
federal Labor Management Relations Act, concluded that the indus-
trial alliance between the two companies was so close that one may
be regarded as the "ally" of the other, and therefore the picketing of
the one was permissable during a labor dispute with the other and
did not constitute a secondary boycott.'
On the basis of the allegation that the picketing constituted a
secondary boycott, the case should have been presented to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board for determination. Section 158 (b) (4)
of the Labor Management Relations Act2 proscribes a secondary boy-
cott as a union unfair labor practice, and Section 160 (a) of the Act
'General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v.
American Tobacco Company, 264 S.W. 2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1954), cert. granted,
348 U.S. 813 (1954).
229 U.S.C. sec. 158 (b) (4) (1952) states: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents-
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer ... to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.....
'29 U.S.C. sec. 160 (a) (1952) states: "The Board is empowered . . . to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice... affecting com-
merce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or other-
wise ....
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vests jurisdiction in the NLRB to determine the case. The Supreme
Court held in December, 1953, that state regulation of labor relations
has been precluded from remedying unfair labor practices as pre-
scribed by Section 158 of the Act.4 This grievance, therefore, was not
subject to litigation in the tribunals of a state, as the power and duty
of primary decision lie with the NLRB and not with the state courts.5
On cross appeal, the Union attempted to nullify the injunction
granted by the Chancellor, which required the employees of the com-
mon carrier to cross the picket line.6
The Court of Appeals rejected the Union's contention that the
employees' right to refuse to cross the picket line, as provided in their
collective bargaining agreement, was exclusively controlled by the
Labor Management Relations Act.7 The court declared that, under
the Constitution" and Statutes9 of Kentucky, common carriers and
their employees have an absolute duty to serve all members of the
public without discrimination, and the failure to cross the picket line
and handle freight tendered the carrier for transportation would sub-
ject the employees to criminal prosecution under the statutes of the
Commonwealth.'0 The court further stated that nothing in the Labor
Management Relations Act nor in the decisions of the Supreme Court
construing this Act made legal what the several states have branded
illegal. It also said that federal jurisdiction cannot be invoked to
protect a course of action which is in conflict with the declared public
policy of a state.:"
The Supreme Court has held that picketing which violates a state
statute12 or the declared public policy of a state' 3 is not constitutionally
protected as a means of free speech and may be enjoined by a state
court, but state jurisdiction may not be invoked where the Labor
Management Relations Act has vested jurisdiction in the NLRB to
enforce the policies of the Act when the union or the employer is in
an industry affecting commerce. 14
' Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Building Trades Council
v. Kinard Construction Company, 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
'Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 4.
1 Supra note 1, at 252.
'Id. at 254.
8 KY. CoNsT. see. 196.
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 281.685 (1, 2); 281.990 (1).10Supra note 1, at 254.1 bid.
" United Association of Journeymen, Plumbers and Steamfitters v. Graham,
345 U.S. 192 (1953); Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490(1949).
o Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Building Service Employees Union
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
' Supra note 4.
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In NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Company8 the Supreme Court
recognized that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement can,
in accordance with a proviso in Section 158 (b) (4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act,16 include in their contract a provision
whereby the employees are given the right to refuse to cross a picket
line. In accordance with such an agreement, a refusal by employees
to cross a picket line would not constitute an unfair labor practice on
the part of the union, or render the employees liable, as it would be a
protected activity under Section 157 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. 17
In the instant case, a Kentucky statute18 has been applied not only
to deprive the employees of the specific right to include in their col-
lective bargaining agreement a provision giving them the right to re-
fuse to cross a picket line, but also to deprive them of the rights ex-
pressly guaranteed them in Section 157 of the Act. If the refusal was
individual or collective, it was protected by Section 158(b) (4), and
if the refusal was concerted, it was protected by Section 157.
The right to refuse to cross a picket line being a protected activity
on the part of the employees and the union, an injunction could not
properly be granted in a state court. The Supreme Court has held that
the protection of Section 157 of the Labor Management Relations Act
pre-empts the field of labor relations and precludes the states from
acting in this field,19 even though the employees involved are the
employees of a common carrier.20
Jms LEviN
[Editor's note-After this note had completed the editorial process, the United
States Supreme Court, on certiorari, unanimously reversed the Kentucky court and
set aside the order. (April 15, 1955) (75 S.Ct ................ U.S .....
- 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
1629 U.S.C. sec. 158 (b) (4) (1952) states: . . . That nothing contained in
this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to
enter upon the premises of any employer ... if the employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ...."
1x 29 U.S.C. sec. 157 (1952) states: "Employees shall have the right to ..
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities, for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or the mutual aid or protection.
'z Supra note 9.
Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340
U.S. 383 (1951), where at 390 the Court says: ".... Since the NLRB was givenjurisdiction to enforce rights of the employees, it is clear that the Federal Act had
occupied the field to the exclusion of state regulation. Plankinton and O'Brien
both show that states may not regulate in respects guaranteed by Congress in
Section 157."
1 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 4, and Amalgamated Association v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra note 19.
